ment authorities regularly examine all banks, especially those that have sustained substantial losses or show other signs of weakness that might lead to failure. Insolvent banks, or banks that appear in imminent danger of becoming insolvent, may be declared failed by their primary regulator in conjunction with the FDIC. The FDIC acts as the receiver or liquidating agent for federally insured banks that fail and is required by law to resolve each failure in the manner that imposes the least cost on the deposit insurance system.
T
he financial crisis and recession of 2007-09 brought a sharp increase in the number of depository institution failures in the United States and elsewhere. Between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2010, a total of 318 U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions (hereafter "banks") failed-nearly 4 percent of the total number in operation on December 31, 2006. Failed banks held approximately $436 billion of deposits-nearly 6 percent of the total deposits held in U.S. banks on December 31, 2006. 1 Compared with firms in most other industries, banks are heavily regulated and supervised by government authorities. Furthermore, their principal form of liabilities-customer deposits-are insured by a government agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Govern -1 Data on failed bank and savings institution deposits are from their last available quarterly statement of condition before failure. The data reported here are for failures of U.S. chartered commercial banks and savings institutions located in the 50 states and Washington, D.C., and exclude data for Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories, as well as for one bankers' bank, one cooperative bank, and two industrial banks that failed during the period and appear in the list of bank failures on the FDIC website (www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html).
In recent years, most bank failures have been resolved through a "purchase and assumption" (P&A) transaction in which some or all of the assets of the failed bank are sold to a healthy bank, which may also assume some or all of the failed bank's liabilities, including all insured deposits. 2 The FDIC solicits bids from potential acquirers and is required by law to select the qualifying bid that imposes the least cost on the deposit insurance fund. (The FDIC usually pays the acquirer an amount based on the excess of the value of liabilities it assumes over the value of the assets or enters into a loss-sharing agreement with the acquiring bank.) Occasionally, however, failed banks are liquidated, with the FDIC paying off insured depositors and liquidating all of the failed bank's assets. Among the 318 failures noted above, 299 were resolved through P&A transactions and 19 were resolved through a deposit payoff and liquidation or other means. 3 This article examines how acquisitions of failed banks during 2007-10 affected the concentration of local U.S. banking markets. Concentration measures are used often to gauge the competitiveness of markets. Although the threat of entry by potential competitors may deter firms from exerting market power in industries with a small number of firms-even just one firm-a high degree of concentration is often taken as a sign of a lack of competition in a market. 4 Further, researchers have found that banks in more concentrated local markets tend to charge higher interest rates on loans and pay lower rates on deposits. They also tend to behave more conservatively and be less cost efficient than banks in less concentrated markets. 5 Bank regulators use Department of Justice guidelines for market concentration to evaluate the competitive effects of proposed bank mergers and acquisitions. Proposed transactions that would increase market concentration significantly are subject to more scrutiny and are more likely to be rejected on antitrust grounds than transactions that would not increase concentration significantly. 6 In compiling lists of potential bidders for failed banks, the FDIC considers market competition, as well as other factors. However, the FDIC does not automatically reject bids that would increase market concentration significantly.
Bank regulators use data on deposits held at bank branch offices to measure the concentration of local banking markets. Similarly, this article uses these data to examine how acquisitions of failed banks have affected the concentration of local U.S. banking markets. The merger of two banks with no geographic markets in common will have no effect on the concentration of any local banking markets. However, acquirers of many failed banks have branches in markets served by the failed bank. This article investigates how such transactions have affected the concentration of local banking markets by comparing the actual levels of concentration in those markets before a bank failure with hypothetical, or "pro forma," levels constructed by treating the acquiring and failed banks as having merged before the date of failure. Further, for markets with many bank failures or especially large increases in concentration, the article evaluates how all failed bank acquisitions by in-market competitors since 2007 affected concentration. Although acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors produced large increases in concentration in a few, mainly rural, banking markets, such acqui- 
ACQUIRERS OF FAILED BANKS
The majority (94 percent) of the 318 failures of U.S. banks between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2010, were resolved by P&A transactions. In total, 178 banks acquired some or all of the assets and liabilities of one or more failed banks during this period. In general, the acquirers of failed banks were larger, in terms of both total assets and deposits, and operated more branch offices in more banking markets than failed banks. Table 1 Savings institutions traditionally have focused on residential mortgage lending, and many experienced large losses when mortgage delinquencies rose during 2007-10. Several large savings institutions, including Washington Mutual Bank, failed during this period. Although many commercial banks also succumbed to the downturn in real estate markets, failed commercial banks tended to be smaller than failed savings institutions. The average (median) total assets and deposits of failed savings institutions were $9.5 billion ($352 million) and $5.6 billion ($307 million), respectively, whereas the comparable figures for failed commercial banks were $628 million ($223 million) and $478 million ($185 million).
Acquirers of failed institutions, which included both commercial banks and savings institutions, often were much larger than the firms they acquired. The average (median) total assets and deposits of acquiring institutions were $14.7 billion ($649 million) and $7.8 billion ($466 million), respectively. Acquirers also tended to operate more branch offices in more geographic areas than acquired banks. The largest acquirer (in terms of number of branches) operated 2,679 branches in 17 states and another operated branches in 26 states. The median number of branches operated by acquirers was 11 branches. Although the largest failed banks also had many branch offices, the median number of branches operated by failed commercial banks and savings institutions were 3 and 7, respectively, and most failed institutions operated branches in fewer unique zip code regions, counties, and states than did acquirers of failed banks. 8
IMPACT OF FAILED BANK ACQUISITIONS ON MARKET CONCENTRATION
When it compiles a list of potential acquirers for a failed bank, the FDIC "takes into account the failed institution's geographic location, competitive environment, minority-owned status, Table 2 . Although there were 318 failed banks during the period, nine of those banks were chartered after June 30, 2006, and thus the summary information in Table 2 is based on data for only 258 failed commercial banks and 51 failed savings institutions. Likewise, 12 of the 178 acquirers were chartered after June 30, 2006, and hence the summary information for acquirers is based on only 166 observations. 1 5 8 M AY / J U N E 2 0 1 1 
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M AY / J U N E 2 0 1 1 1 5 9 overall financial condition, asset size, capital level, and regulatory ratings" (FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, p. 9) . A bank with significant operations in the markets served by a failed bank might be willing to bid more than other banks for the assets of the failed bank for several reasons. For example, an in-market bidder might have more information about the local market and the failed bank's customers, and thereby be able to serve those customers at lower cost than other potential bidders. The cost of absorbing the operations of the failed bank might also be lower for a local bidder. Further, a local bank might purchase a failed competitor to deter entry by outside competitors. Many failed bank resolutions during 2007-10 involved the acquisition of some or all of the assets and deposits of the failed bank by an inmarket competitor (i.e., another bank that already operated at least one branch in markets served by the failed bank). Measures of market concentration, such as n-firm concentration ratios and the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), are used often to help evaluate the competitiveness of banking and other markets. Banks are required to report the amount of deposits held by each of their branch offices on June 30 of each year. 10 To enforce antitrust laws, bank regulators use these data to consider how proposed bank mergers would affect the concentration of bank deposits in local banking markets. Ordinarily, proposed mergers are not challenged on competitive grounds unless they would result in a post-merger HHI value of more than 1800 points and an increase in the index of more than 200 points. 11 These guidelines are not binding on the resolution of failed banks, but as noted previously, the FDIC does consider the competitiveness of banking markets when compiling lists of potential bidders for failed banks.
Similar to the approach used by bank regulators in antitrust enforcement, I estimate the impact of failed bank acquisitions on the concentration of local banking markets by comparing the actual values for each market in which both banks had branches with the pro forma HHI values calculated under the assumption that the acquiring and failed banks had merged before the bank failure. Obviously, the merger of two banks that share no geographic markets will have no impact on the HHI values of any local banking markets. However, the merger of banks that operate in the same markets will, all else equal, reduce the number of banks in those markets and increase the deposits held by the acquiring bank, and thereby increase the value of the HHI.
Estimates of market concentration, such as the HHI, require data on the allocation of customer deposits across bank branches. For banking markets (metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs] pro forma values calculated under the assumption that the failed and acquiring banks had already been operating as a single institution on that date. 12 Most acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors during 2007-10 did not result in a substantial increase in local market concentration. Comparing actual HHI values on the June 30 before a bank failure with pro forma values derived by assuming that the failed bank and its acquirer had already merged, I find that acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors resulted in an average increase in HHI value of 54.1 points and a median increase of just 1.3 points. Further, I estimate that the acquisition of a failed bank by an in-market competitor increased the HHI value by more than 200 points in only 21 markets, which are listed in Table 3 . As shown in the table, the 15 markets with the largest difference between the pro forma HHI and pre-failure HHI values (i.e., difference between "Pro Forma HHI" and "HHI Before Acquisition") are all sparsely populated non-MSA counties. Transactions resulting in a difference greater than 200 points also occurred in six MSAs, five of which are relatively small. 13 Whereas Table 3 lists markets where the differences between the hypothetical and pre-failure HHI values exceed 200 points, Table 4 lists markets where the pre-failure HHI exceeded 1800 points, which is the level at which the Department of Justice considers a market to be concentrated. Terrell County, Texas, was the most concentrated U.S. banking market in which a failed bank was acquired by another in-market bank. Sanderson Besides Terrell County, Texas, 12 other counties had market HHI values greater than 1800 on the June 30 before a bank failure and experienced an increase in HHI value of more than 200 points due to the acquisition of a failed bank by an inmarket competitor. Of course, the fact that these counties had highly concentrated banking markets that were made even more concentrated by the acquisition of failed banks does not imply that the FDIC ignored the competitive environment in soliciting bids for failed banks. Market competition is only one consideration in identifying potential bidders for failed banks, and the FDIC is required to pursue the least costly resolution of bank failures. 14 Next, I examine the impact of acquisitions of failed banks in banking markets that had multiple in-market acquisitions within a 12-month period. Table 5 calculating HHI values for use in competitive analysis of local banking markets, reflecting a presumption that deposits at savings institutions are similar, but not perfect, substitutes for deposits at commercial banks. For this article, however, I assign full weight to savings institutions' deposits when calculating HHI values. Since the article focuses primarily on changes in HHI due to acquisitions of failed banks, the choice of how to weight savings institutions deposits is largely immaterial. 13 In calculating pro forma HHI values, I assume that acquirers purchase all of the deposits of failed banks, which I estimate to equal deposits held on the most recent June 30 before failure. However, acquirers sometimes purchase less than the total deposits of failed banks, and the deposits of failed banks on the date of failure can differ substantially from the amount held by the bank on the prior June 30. Hence, the pro forma HHI values presented in this article are estimates of the effect of in-market acquisitions on market concentration that may overstate or understate the true effect.
the 15 acquisitions as a whole increased the HHI value for the Chicago market by just 24 points, from 563 to 587 points. Among the banking markets noted in Table 5 , San Diego had the largest estimated increase in HHI, at just 46 points. Hence, the evidence for markets with multiple in-market acquisitions of failed banks during a 12-month period indicates that the concentration of those markets was not substantially affected by the acquisitions. Table 6 Table 6 , Houston experienced the largest impact of such acquisitions on market concentration. I estimate the acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors increased the HHI of the Houston market by 323 points, or 27.8 percent. The next-largest impact was in the New York City market, where failed bank acquisitions increased the HHI by 112 points, or 9.9 percent. In both cases, the acquisition of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan Chase Bank was the main reason for the increase in HHI. The HHI values for both the Houston and New York City markets remained below 1800 after the acquisition, however, indicating that neither market was particularly concentrated. 
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CONCLUSION
The structure of the U.S. banking industry has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s, when the number of U.S. banks reached a postWorld War II peak. Advances in informationprocessing technology and the removal of most legal barriers to branch banking have been the main drivers of a substantial consolidation of the banking industry (Berger, 2003) . Much of the Table 7 Markets with an HHI Increase of at Least 500 Points (2006-10) consolidation has taken the form of mergers of solvent banks. However, waves of failures, both in the late 1980s and early 1990s and again in the wake of the financial crisis and recession of 2007-09, also contributed to industry consolidation and, at least in some markets, substantial increases in concentration. 17 Failures eliminated 318 U.S. banks during 2007-10, or about 4 percent of the total number of banks operating at the end of 2006. The assets and deposits of 171 of those failed banks were acquired by institutions that already had branches in markets served by the failed bank. Those acquisitions contributed to increased concentration of local banking markets. However, this article finds that except for a few rural banking markets, acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors generally had only a small impact on market concentration. Most banks that failed during 2007-10 were small, and although many of those banks were acquired by much larger institutions, those acquisitions generally had little impact on market concentration. Acquisitions of larger banks that failed during 2007-10, such as the acquisition of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan Chase Bank, also had only limited impact on the concentration in most of the banking markets involved. Among large MSAs, the Houston and New York City banking markets were most affected by the acquisition of Washington Mutual but both remained relatively unconcentrated after the acquisition. 18
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M AY / J U N E 2 0 1 1 1 6 7 17 Data from the 1990s indicate that branching deregulation and industry consolidation did not generally increase the concentration of local urban banking markets, though it did increase concentration over larger geographic regions (Dick, 2006) . 18 This article does not investigate the impact on market concentration of acquisitions of certain distressed commercial banks, such as Countrywide Bank; Wachovia Bank, NA; and National City Bank, which were acquired by other banks without being declared failed and closed by regulators. Those acquisitions may have had significant impacts on concentration in some banking markets. Although not the subject of the present article, the data and methods used here could be applied to investigate the effects of these and other acquisitions on the concentration of individual banking markets.
